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ABSTRACT
Little research exists measuring the effectiveness of privacy
legislation as compared to self-regulation. As policy makers,
advocates, and industry groups debate new privacy legislation,
empirical research on the effectiveness of existing privacy
legislation is needed to help inform the debate. We conducted a
longitudinal study of the privacy policies posted online between
1999 and 2005 for fifty companies in the United States financial
industry. We analyzed these policies to determine how they
changed during this time period and what changes were likely
prompted by the compliance requirements of the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act privacy rule. We also conducted a similar analysis of
the privacy policies from ten retailers over the same period. The
retailers were not subject to US. privacy regulation and thus serve
as a control group. Our research shows that since the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act has gone into effect, financial privacy notices are
more complete; however, we have not found a significant change
in the privacy choices offered to consumers. We observed that
large banks and credit card companies minimally comply with the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. While complying with the regulation,
they are still able to collect large amounts of information about
customers and share the information extensively with affiliates.
They also take advantage of the exceptions provided by the law to
share information with third parties without giving choices to
consumers. Finally, we observed that retailers offer better third-
party information sharing options than financial institutions.
I. INTRODUCTION
Privacy is a major concern for American Internet users, as
indicated by numerous surveys over the past several years.1 Over the
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past decade, the U.S. Congress has enacted several privacy-related
bills, including the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act of 1996 ("HIPAA"), the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act
of 1998 ("COPPA"), and Title V of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
("GLB") enacted in 1999. In addition, over thirty privacy-related bills
have been proposed and debated by the 10 8th and 10 9 th Congress.2
Some privacy activists argue for EU-style 3 privacy laws, while
others push for more limited legislation supplemented by self-
regulation. Industry groups oppose most privacy regulations, although
recently some companies have started supporting privacy legislation.4
Recent security breaches5 at major financial institutions have left
millions of customers susceptible to identity theft.6  As a result both
1 Lorrie Faith Cranor, Joseph Reagle and Mark S. Ackerman, Beyond Concern:
Understanding Net Users'Attitudes About Online Privacy (AT&T Labs-Research, 1999),
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/icpw/comments/attlabs.htm; Consumer Privacy Attitudes and
Behaviors Survey Wave II (Harris Interactive, 2001), http://www.bbbonline.org/
UnderstandingPrivacy/library/harris2-execsum.pdf; A Survey of Consumer Privacy Attitudes
and Behaviors (Harris Interactive, 2000), http://www.bbbonline.org/
understandingprivacy/library/harrissummary.pdf; Louis Harris and Assoc., Inc. and Dr. Alan
F. Westin, E-Commerce Privacy Survey (1998), http://www.privacyexchange.org/iss/
surveys/ecommsum.html; Joseph Turow, Americans & Online Privacy: The System Is Broken
(Philadelphia: Annenberg Public Policy Center, University of Pennsylvania, 2003),
http://www.ascupenn.edu/usr/jturow/intemet-privacy-report/36-page-turow-version-9.pdf.
2 Electronic Privacy Information Center, "EPIC Bill Track,"
http://www.epic.org/privacy/bill-track.html (accessed March 10, 2006).
3 The European Union Directive on Data Protection provides a framework for privacy
regulations in EU countries. These laws provide for consistent privacy rules across all
industry sectors, requiring that data subjects be given notice about data practice and that
consent be provided for secondary data uses. Data protection commissioners in each country
play a role in enforcing these laws.
4 For example, Microsoft recently began advocating comprehensive Federal Privacy
Legislation. See Microsoft, "Microsoft Advocates Comprehensive Federal Privacy
Legislation," http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/pressI2005/nov05/11-
03DataPrivacyPR.mspx (accessed Sept. 20, 2006).
5 Some notable examples: CitiFinancial on June 6, 2005 announced that it has lost 3.9 million
customer data records in transit; Choicepoint on February 15, 2005 announced that thieves
posing as legitimate customers had downloaded 145,000 consumer data records and at least
750 fraud cases were known. DSW Shoe Warehouse announced on March 8, 2005 that
hackers stole 1.4 million credit card and drivers' license numbers. Privacy Rights
Clearinghouse, "A Chronology of Data Breaches,"
http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/chrondatabreaches.htm (accessed Oct. 12, 2006).
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state and federal legislatures have proposed a host of new bills aimed
at increasing the security and confidentiality of customer data.
7
As debate continues on new privacy proposals, it is useful to have
data about the effectiveness of existing privacy regulations and self-
regulatory programs to help inform the debate. Often, the only data
available comes in the form of anecdotes. However, as organizations
and companies increasingly publish privacy policies, their data
practices are becoming more transparent.
We conducted a longitudinal study of financial institutions'
privacy policies. By collecting these policies over a period of six
years, beginning prior to the enactment of GLB, we were able to study
the impact of GLB on privacy policies and corporate data practices. In
this paper we present our findings, which indicate that GLB has had
only a modest impact on the privacy policies and practices of financial
institutions. We found that financial privacy notices are more
complete since the enactment of GLB; however, we have not found a
significant change in the privacy choices offered to consumers. We
observed that large banks and credit card companies minimally
comply with GLB: they collect considerable amounts of customer
information and share the information extensively with affiliates, and
they take advantage of the exceptions provided by the law to share this
information with third parties without giving consumers choices.
Finally, we observed that choices about third-party sharing offered by
financial institutions tend to be worse than those available from the
unregulated retail industry.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
We begin by introducing the relevant financial privacy legislation,
discussing the role of privacy self-regulation, and describing other
studies that have conducted privacy policy surveys. At the end of this
section we distinguish our study from the previous work and discuss
the goals of our study.
6 "Without a Trace," Wall Street Journal Online, September 15, 2005,
http://online.wsj.com/documents/info-idtheft05O4.html
7 Tom Zeller Jr., "Data Security Laws Seem Likely, So Consumers and Businesses Vie to
Shape Them," The New York Times, Nov. 1, 2005.
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A. GRAMM-LEACH-BLILEY ACT
The Financial Modernization Act of 1999, also known as the
"Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act" ("GLB") was signed into law on
November 12, 1999 and became effective on July 1, 2001.8 The law
modified previous federal laws9 and "allow[ed] for the creation of a
financial holding company. . . . Such companies may include a
commercial bank and subsidiaries that conduct financial activities or
activities incidental to financial activities." 10 In other words, GLB
enables banks to engage in a whole line of financial activities. Late in
the legislative process, legislators were concerned at the prospect that
the consolidation of the financial industry would lead to privacy
invasions. As a result of this concern, Title V was added to GLB."
Title V requires financial institutions to provide an initial "clear and
conspicuous notice of privacy policies and practices to all customers,"
an annual notice of their privacy policies, and an opportunity for
consumers to opt out of disclosing protected financial information to
nonaffiliated third parties. 12  The FTC's final rule 13 specifies the
minimum information that should be included in the privacy notices
and provides examples of GLB-compliant privacy policies.
8 Senate Banking Committee, "Effective Dates of Key Provisions in Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act," Nov. 17, 1999, http://banking.senate.gov/pre199/1117glb.htm.
9 The Glass-Steagall Act constrained the ability of FDIC member banks to affiliate with
insurance or securities companies; The Bank Holding Company Act prohibited banks from
controlling companies unless they performed banking related services. James R. Barth, R.
Dan Brumbaugh Jr., and James A. Wilcox, "The Repeal of Glass-Steagall and the Advent of
Broad Banking," 3 (2000), http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/workpaper/wp2000-5.pdf.
'0 Richard C. Turkington and Anita L. Allen, Privacy Law: Cases and Materials, 2nd ed.
(West Group, 2002), 496.
11 For a more thorough treatment of the legislative process of GLB, see Peter P. Swire, "The
Surprising Virtues of the New Financial Privacy Law," Minnesota Law Review 86, no. 6
(2002): 1273-94.
12 Turkington and Allen, Privacy Law: Cases and Materials, 497.
13 The FTC and eight other federal agencies, charged to implement the GLB privacy rule,
came up with a set of guidelines to implement the GLB. 16 C.F.R. § 313 (2005).
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However, GLB has two very important exceptions: 14 first, it allows
disclosure to an "affiliate"' 5 of the financial institutions without
providing notice of the disclosure and opportunity to opt out. Thus,
personal information may flow freely between affiliated financial
institutions; second, it permits disclosure of nonpublic personal
financial information to nonaffiliated third parties that jointly offer
marketing with the original institution.
GLB does not preempt other state laws that offer stronger privacy
controls. As a result, a number of states have taken advantage of this
and have enacted their own privacy laws that are stronger than GLB.16
For example, the California legislature deemed the GLB protection
insufficient and enacted a financial privacy law (California SB 1) that
requires companies to give consumers an "opt-in" choice before
sharing with unaffiliated third parties, and an "opt-out" choice before
sharing with affiliates. Vermont's Department of Banking, Insurance,
Securities, and Health Care Administration also adopted opt-in
provisions for information sharing.
Responses to the GLB privacy rule have been mixed. Many
privacy law scholars were critical of exceptions and the choices
offered in the law. For example, Pandozzi concluded that "[the GLB
privacy section, Title V,] is riddled with loopholes and exceptions that
severely weaken, if not paralyze, the consumers' power to opt out of
information sharing between financial institutions and nonaffiliated
14 Other exceptions that allow for data disclosure without notice and choice include: (1)
disclosures in response to consumer requests for specified financial services, (2) when
necessary to protect the financial institution's records and to prevent actual or potential fraud,
(3) disclosures to insurance rate advisory organizations, (4) disclosures to law enforcement
agencies, (5) disclosures in connection with proposed sales or mergers, (6) disclosures to the
financial institution's lawyers and accountants, and (7) in compliance with federal, state, or
local legal requirements. These exceptions are arguably in alignment with customer
expectations of privacy. Thus, in this paper, we will not address these exceptions.
15 Affiliate is defined as "any company that controls, is controlled by, or is under common
control with another company." 16 C.F.R. § 313.3(a) (2005). As an illustration, Citigroup
owns Citibank, Dinner Club Card, and Smith Barney Investment. These companies can be
considered affiliates. Citigroup, "Our Businesses,"
http://www.citigroup.com/citigroup/business/brands.htm (accessed Sept. 20, 2006).
16 Virginia Boyd, "Financial Privacy in the United States and the European Union: A Path to
Trans-Atlantic Regulatory Harmonization," http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/
pifs/pdfs/virginiaboyd.pdf (Harvard Law School, 2005), 17-18.
20061
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third parties." 17 Paul M. Schwartz argues that GLB's promise falls
short because the opt-out requirement burdens the consumer. He
wrote, "[t]he opt-out rule fails to impose any penalty on the party with
superior knowledge - the financial entity - should negotiations over
further use and transfer of data fail to occur. . . . [T]he GLB Act
places the burden of bargaining on the less-informed party, the
individual consumer."
18
Peter Swire has criticized some aspects of GLB, but argued, in an
article titled "The Surprising Virtues of the New Financial Privacy
Law," that the law has some "surprising merits."'19 For example, the
broad definition of "financial institutions" in the law makes it
applicable to many institutions, and the level of detail required by the
GLB notice requirement requires financial institutions to examine their
data practices and creates more possibilities for accountability. 20
B. SELF-REGULATION
In the absence of legislation, industries or companies sometimes
voluntarily adopt a set of principles or practices to protect consumer
privacy, functioning as self-regulation. Generally speaking, industries
seek to self-regulate to avoid legislation, or to anticipate legislation,
although self-regulation can also be used to implement legislation, and
to supplement legislation.
2 1
The US Federal Trade Commission's online privacy activities in
the mid 1990s led to several self-regulatory initiatives to improve data
privacy practices, including the BBBOnLine and TRUSTe privacy seal
programs. Each of these initiatives requires participating entities to
post privacy notices that conform to guidelines based on the Fair
17 Neal R. Pandozzi, "Beware of Banks Bearing Gifts: Gramm-Leach-Bliley and the
Constitutionality of Federal Financial Privacy Legislation," University of Miami Law Review
55 (2001): 234.
18 Paul M. Schwartz, "Property, Privacy, and Personal Data," Harvard Law Review 117
(2004): 2055, 2102.
19 Peter P. Swire, "The Surprising Virtues of the New Financial Privacy Law," Minnesota Law
Review 86 (2002): 1265.
20 Id. at 1321-22.
21 Peter Hustinx, "The Role of Self-Regulation in the Scheme of Data Protection," 13th
Conference of Data Protection Commissioners (Strasbourg: 1991).
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Information Practice Principles. TRUSTe was founded in 1997 by the
Electronic Frontier Foundation and the CommerceNet Consortium.
The TRUSTe program evolved over time, going through a number of
major revisions. TRUSTe awards a "trustmark" to Web sites that
agree to adhere to a set of privacy principles and agree to comply with
ongoing TRUSTe oversight and consumer complaint resolution
procedures. About 2000 Web sites had TRUSTe seals in 2005. The
BBBOnLine privacy program is operated by the Council of Better
Business Bureaus and is similar to the TRUSTe program. As of
January 2005, 630 Web sites had BBBOnLine privacy seals.
Previous research on the effectiveness of privacy seals has been
limited. Moores and Dhillon surveyed the performance of Web seals
and gave them a mixed review, citing mostly anecdotal evidence. 22
More recently, Moores surveyed 143 students about privacy seals and
concluded that most did not understand their meaning and could not
recognize them.23 These studies suggest that privacy seals may not be
succeeding as mechanisms for engendering consumer trust. However,
questions remain about whether they are playing a role in improving
privacy practices. There is some evidence that privacy policies on
Web sites with privacy seals are more readable than policies on sites
without privacy seals, but the substantive differences between sites
with privacy seals and those without privacy seals are not clear.
In The Governance of Privacy, Bennet and Raab describe four
general ways companies self-regulate: privacy commitments, privacy
codes of practice, privacy standards, and privacy seals. 25  Privacy
commitments are brief statements of commitment to the set of privacy
principles that companies abide by. An example of privacy
commitment is that private sector companies are encouraged to adopt
the 1981 OECD Guidelines. Privacy codes of practice refer to a set of
22 Trevor T. Moores and Gurpreet Dhillon, "Do Privacy Peals in E-commerce Really Work?,"
Communications of the ACM 46, no. 12 (2003): 265-27 1.
23 Trevor Moores, "Do Consumers Understand the Role of Privacy Seals in E-commerce?,"
Communications of the ACM, 48, no. 3 (2005): 86-9 1.
24 G.R. Milne, M.J. Culnan, and H. Greene, "A Longitudinal Assessment of Online Privacy
Notice Readability: Implications for Developing a Short Notice Format," Journal of Public
Policy and Marketing (forthcoming).
25 Colin J. Bennett and Charles D. Raab, "Self Regulatory Instruments," The Governance of
Privacy: Policy Instruments in Global Perspective (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company,
2002).
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rules for employees, members, or member organizations to follow.
They provide more than a simple claim. Privacy standards harmonize
the existing codes. One example is the Canadian Standards
Association Model Code for the Protection of Personal Information.
As already discussed, examples of privacy seals includes TRUSTe and
BBBOnline.
The banking industry adopted privacy self-regulatory measures
prior to the enactment of GLB. In late 1997, several banking industry
associations26 agreed on a set of privacy principles to respond to rising
privacy concerns (and perhaps to avoid legislation).27 The privacy
principles cover eight separate areas.
[1] Recognition of a customer's expectation of privacy. [2]
Use, collection and retention of customer information. [3]
Maintenance of accurate information. [4] Limiting employee
access to information. [5] Protection of information via
established security procedures. [6] Restriction on the
disclosure of account information. [7] Maintaining customer
privacy in business relationships with third parties. [8]
Making an institution's privacy principles known to the
customer.28
C. RELATED WORK
Economists, legal scholars, and policy makers have researched and
debated the best way to protect personal privacy. Varian and Acquisti
studied economic aspects of privacy such as transaction costs and
asymmetric information.29 Tang et al., treated the matter analytically
26 The American Bankers Association ("ABA"), The Bankers Roundtable ("Roundtable"), the
Banking Industry Technology Secretariat ("BITS"), the Consumer Banks Association
("CBA"), and the Independent Bankers Association of America ("IBAA") announced on
September 18th, 1997 that they had endorsed a common set of privacy principles. "Banking
Industry Unites On Customer Privacy," Press Release, September 18, 1997, available at
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/comments/016.pdf.
27 See id.
21 Id. at2.
29 Hal R. Varian, "Economic Aspects of Personal Privacy," Privacy and Self-Regulation in the
Information Age (U.S. Dept. of Commerce, 1997), http://www.ntia.doc.gov/reports/privacy/
selfreg1 .htm# I C; Alessandro Acquisti, "Privacy and Security of Personal Information:
Economic Incentives and Technological Solutions," The Economics of Information Security,
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using formal economic models. Their analysis suggests "regimes that
place the onus on consumers are socially optimal when few people are
sensitive to privacy violations or when the loss they face from privacy
violations is low. Conversely, when many people care about privacy
protection and the potential loss they face is high, mandatory standards
are socially optimal. Finally, for intermediate values, seal-of-approval
programs provide socially optimal privacy protection.
30
Surveys have been an important tool to inform public policy
debates on protecting privacy. For example, the FTC surveyed privacy
policies posted online in 1998 and 2000.7 Based on these surveys, it
recommended industry self-regulation in 1998, but later resolved to
recommend legislation to complement industry self-regulatory
programs in 2000. Besides the FTC's privacy policy surveys,
Atkinson surveyed privacy policies online in 2002,32 and Milne and
Culnan compared the previous surveys.33 These surveys, however, did
not look specifically at financial institutions' privacy policies. The
FDIC surveyed privacy practices posted by financial institutions in
1999, 34 but previously there has not been a longitudinal study that
tracks the changes in financial institution privacy policies before and
after GLB went into effect.
ed. L. Jean Camp and Stephen Lewis (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2004); Alessandro
Acquisti, "Privacy in Electronic Commerce and the Economics of Immediate Gratification,"
Proccedings of the 5th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (New York, NY: ACM
Press, 2004); Alessandro Acquisti and J Grossklags, "Privacy and Rationality in Individual
Decision Making," IEEE Security & Privacy (2005): 26-33.
3 0 Zhulei Tang, Yu (Jeffrey) Hu and Michael D. Smith, "Protecting Online Privacy: Self-
Regulation, Mandatory Standards, or Caveat Emptor," 4th Workshop on the Economics of
Information Security (Cambridge, MA: 2005), http://infosecon.net/workshop/pdf/3 1.pdf.
31 Federal Trade Commission, Privacy Online: A Report to Congress (Federal Trade
Commission, 1998); Federal Trade Commission, Privacy Online: Fair Information Practices
in the Marketplace: A Report to Congress (Washington DC: Federal Trade Commission,
2000).
32 William F. Adkinson Jr., Jeffrey A. Eisenach and Thomas M. Lenard, Privacy Online: A
Report on the Information Practices and Policies of Commercial Web Sites (The Progress and
Freedom Foundation, 2002).
33 George R. Milne and Mary J. Culnan, "Using the Content of Online Privacy Notices to
Inform Public Policy: A Longitudinal Analysis of the 1998-2001 U.S Web Surveys," The
Information Society 18 (2002): 345-359.
34 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and Office of Thrift Supervision, Interagency
Financial Institution Web Site Privacy Survey Report (Washington DC: 1999).
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One study analyzed the privacy policies of nine U.S. healthcare
Web sites before and after HIPAA went into effect and concluded that
federal health privacy regulations have not improved the level of
privacy protections at these sites.3
5
Anton et. al., analyzed financial privacy policies after GLB was
enacted and observed that "financial privacy statements lack clarity
and are full of statements that regular consumer cannot understand."
The Center for Democracy and Technology studied the opt-out choices
financial institutions offer to consumers and concluded that the GLB is
off to "a slow, confusing start to giving customers control. 3 7
Current literature on evaluating the effectiveness of the GLB
privacy rule is based on cross-sectional data in which the state of
privacy is evaluated at a single point in time and is not compared over
time. This literature sheds some light on the effectiveness of GLB.
However, a few important questions have yet to be addressed.
What effect has GLB had on financial institution privacy policies
and practices? This is the overarching question that our research
seeks to address. There is an implicit assumption that the GLB
privacy rule required regulated institutions to change their policies and
practices. However, there has been little empirical data collected on
the types of changes that were made to comply with the law, the extent
of these changes, and the number of institutions impacted.
Did the GLB Act have an impact on the readability of financial
privacy notices? Some regulations may require disclosures that are so
complicated that it is almost impossible to comply without producing
notices that are difficult to read. Other regulations may be
accompanied by guidance that results in more readable notices. A
number of studies have demonstrated that financial privacy notices are
difficult to read and understand. Are the current readability problems
with GLB notices likely caused by the regulation, or have the notices
actually improved (or remained unchanged) as a result of the
regulation?
35 Annie I. Ant6n et al., "An Analysis of Web Site Privacy Policy Evolution in the Presence of
HIPAA," North Carolina State University Computer Science Technical Report # TR-2004-21,
http://www.theprivacyplace.org/papers/hipaa_7_24_submit.pdf.
36 Annie I. Anton et al., "Financial Privacy Policies and the Need for Standardization," IEEE
Security & Privacy (2004): 36-45; Mark Hochhauser, Lost in the Fine Print: Readability of
Financial Privacy Notices (Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, 2001).
37 Center for Democracy and Technology, "Online Banking Privacy: A Slow, Confusing Start
to Giving Customers Control Over Their Information" (2001).
[Vol. 2:3
SHENG & CRANOR
Have regulated companies adopted policies that minimally comply
with GLB, or have they adopted policies that exceed the mandated
requirements? In the absence of regulation, companies respond to
market incentives or other pressures to determine what level of privacy
to offer in their policies. They may adopt privacy-friendly policies in
an attempt to prevent the enactment of new privacy regulation. As
there is often some uncertainty as to what level of privacy will be
sufficient to satisfy regulators or consumers, companies may make
different decisions about the level of privacy to offer. Once privacy
regulation has been adopted, there is no longer uncertainty about what
is necessary to satisfy regulators, and companies that comply with the
regulation are able to advertise that they offer the privacy protections
required by law. Nonetheless, some companies may still have
incentives to provide additional protections that exceed the mandated
requirements. Empirical data is needed to determine the extent to
which companies create policies that exceed the mandated
requirements. This is especially important in the case of GLB, as the
mandated privacy requirements are often criticized as being fairly
minimal.38
How does the level of privacy offered by companies regulated by
GLB compare with the level of privacy offered by companies in
unregulated industries? If a privacy regulation raises the level of
privacy offered by companies in an industry, we might expect to find
lower levels of privacy offered by companies in similar, but
unregulated, industries. If, on the other hand, the regulation reduces
the incentives companies have to offer privacy levels above the
mandated requirements, we may find higher levels of privacy offered
by companies in unregulated industries.
Our research aims to shed light on these four questions through the
collection and analysis of empirical data. Although more data would
be needed to answer all of these questions conclusively, we believe the
data we have collected provide important insights into the answers to
these questions.
III. DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS
If companies provided full disclosure of their privacy practices on
a regular basis, the impact of privacy regulation could be measured
38 For example, Anita Allen asserted that the GLB only provided a floor for privacy
protection. Turkington and Allen, Privacy Law: Cases and Materials, 500.
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through an analysis of these disclosures. However, unregulated
companies are not obligated by law to offer any privacy disclosures,
and regulated companies are required only to make certain types of
privacy disclosures. In the United States, there is no governmental
entity responsible for collecting or maintaining an archive of these
disclosures. Thus it has been difficult to track privacy practices over
time.
The advent of Web site privacy policies has made it much easier to
conduct research on privacy policies. As discussed earlier, a number
of surveys of Web site privacy policies have been performed. Because
Web sites are frequently archived by Internet search engines and
companies attempting to provide archives of the entire Web, it is now
possible to retrieve not only a company's current online privacy
policy, but also privacy policies previously posted on their Web site.
Thus a rich set of data on privacy practices is now available going
back several years. Unfortunately, this data is not 100 percent
complete, and the analysis of this data remains time consuming as it
cannot be completely automated.
Not all companies have Web sites, not all companies have privacy
policies, and not all companies that have both Web sites and privacy
policies post their privacy policies on their Web sites. One limitation
of our approach is that we make the simplifying assumption that the
privacy policies we collect online are somewhat representative of the
privacy policies across an entire industry sector. However, we have
not collected privacy policies from companies that only provide them
offline in order to verify that this assumption is reasonable. Collecting
offline privacy policies requires contacting each company individually
in person, by telephone, or by postal mail, and requesting their
policies. In our experience, finding the correct point of contact within
a financial institution to request a privacy policy is difficult, and some
companies are reluctant to send policies to people who are not already
their customers.
39
A. RESEARCH DATA
We collected privacy policies from sixty U.S. companies with
significant online presence - fifty financial institutions and a control
39 Some of our undergraduate students visited several local bank branch offices to request
privacy policies as part of a class project. At some of these banks the tellers refused to give
them a copy of the privacy policy unless they opened an account.
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group of ten retailers - as shown in Table 1. By "significant online
presence," we mean an institution posted privacy policies online
before 2000, and the policies posted were substantial in content. A
policy is "substantial in content" if it addresses aspects of the
information practice regarding data collection and data sharing. Thus,
an online policy that addresses only Web cookie usage is not
considered to be substantial in content. The fifty financial institutions
whose policies we collected included the top ten U.S. banks with
significant online presence (Table 2) the top ten credit card issuers
(Table 2: Top 10 Banks with Significant Online Presence), 40 and
thirty banks selected randomly from the top 500 banks by asset (Table
3). We also collected the privacy policies of the top ten retailers with
significant online presence (Table 2).42 We sampled randomly from
the top 500 list until we collected thirty banks. We found that 25.9%
of the institutions posted policies online, which were significant in
content, before GLB.
For each company, we collected their privacy policies once a year
from 1999 to 2005. Current policies were collected from the
companies' Web site directly. Policies from 1999 to 2004 were
collected from the Internet Archive.43
4 1 "Largest Credit Card Issuers, 2004." Wall Street Journal, April 8, 2005, p. C1, from Nilson
Report. Market Share Reporter 2006. Thomson Gale, 2006. Reproduced in Business and
Company Resource Center. Farmington Hills, Mich.: Gale Group, June 2002.
https://www.vpn.cmu.edu/http/0/galenet.gale.com/servlet/BCRC/.
41 "OneSource Business Browser US Business Information,"
http://www.onesource.com/products/content_ 11L.asp.
42 David P. Schulz, The Nation's Retail Power Players 2005 (2005),
http://www.stores.org/pdf/05JULYTOP 100.pdf.
43 The Internet Archive is a service that allows people to visit archived versions of Websites
from 1996 to the present time. See Internet Archive, http://www.archive.org/ (accessed March
12, 2006).
2006]
I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
Number of Total Number ofType Companies Policies Collected
Type Companies_ (1999-2005)
Top 10 45
Random 30 168
Credit Card Issuers Top 10 56
Retailers Top 10 45
Table 1: Research Data
I Citigroup Inc.
2 1 JPMoran Chase & Co.
3 1Bank~ of America Corporation14 Wachovia Corporation
5 Wells Fargo & Company
6 U.S. Bancorp
9 BB&T Corporation
13 KeyCorp
14 .Regions Financial Corp.
16 MBNA Corporation
Table 2: Top 10 Banks with Significant Online Presence
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I JpMorgan Llase & Lo.
2Citigroup, Inc.
3MBNA Corporation
4 American Express Credit Corporation
5 Bank of America Corporation
6 Capital One Financial Corporation
7 Discover
8 HSBC USA
9 Providian Financial Corporation
10 jWells Fargo & Company
Table 3: Largest Ten Personal Credit Issuers with Significant
Online Presence
20 AmSouth Bancorporation
23 Marshall & Ilsley Corporation
24 Huntington Bancshares Incorporated
41 First Citizens BancShares, Inc.
54 . Trustmark Corporation
55 UMB Financial Corporation
[69 . Pacific Capital Bancorp
70 Texas Regional Bancshares, Inc.
84 CVB Financial Corp.
134 Financial Institutions, Inc.S154 jCoBiz Inc.
161 Seacoast Banking Corporation of Florida
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178 Arrow Financial Corporation
179 Merchants and Manufacturers Bancorporation, Inc.
212 1 Bank of Granite Corporation
~221 German American Bancorp
F239 QCR Holdings, Inc.
[246 Farmers National Banc Corporation
1282 Washington Banking Company
283- Princeton National Bancorp, Inc.
298 MidSouth Bancorp, Inc.
314 jPenns Woods Bancorp, Inc.
1 jGuaranty Bancshares, Inc.
322 jLCNB Corporation
337 James Monroe Bancorp, Inc.
340 Bank of Commerce Holdings
354 Mid Penn Bancorp, Inc.
41 Northern Trust Corporation
472 ]Pulaski Bank
490 Jones National Bank & Trust
Table 4: The Random Thirty Banks with Significant Online
Presence
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1Kroger
1Target
7 .Walgreen
8 Lowes
10 Safeway
I1I CVS
13 Bestbuy
18 Gap
22 Staples
24 Office Depot
Table 5: Largest Ten Retailers with Significant Online Presence
We collected policies for both the top ten and a random set of
thirty banks because these groups have differing characteristics. Top
ten banks have a large customer base and thus have a larger impact on
consumers than the average bank. In our study, we also wanted to
compare the relative impact of the law on the largest institutions and
average institutions. We selected the top 500 banks as a sampling
frame instead of all the FDIC insured banks because the top 500 banks
accounts for most of the banking industry's total assets.44
We collected privacy policies from an unregulated industry for two
reasons. First, it is difficult to determine whether observed privacy
policy changes are caused by the GLB privacy rule or other factors
that may also be in play during this time, such as increasing use of the
Internet and e-commerce, and a rising awareness of data privacy
issues. By comparing financial privacy policies with policies from an
unregulated industry, we hope to gain a better understanding of which
changes were caused by GLB. A second and perhaps more important
reason is that a non-regulated industry has different incentives to
protect privacy; comparing the privacy they offer with the regulated
industry provides data on the effectiveness of the legislation. Of
44 See National Commercial Banks, Encyclopedia of American Industries. Online Edition
(Thomson Gale 2006).
2006]
I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
course, as no industry operates in a vacuum, regulation in one industry
may also prompt changes in other industries, for example, adopting
self-regulatory initiatives in an attempt to avoid similar regulation.
The ideal control group would be an industry sector similar in
structure to the U.S. financial industry that does not have privacy
regulation. We first considered Canadian banks; however, we found
they are subject to privacy regulation passed in 2000. We chose the
U.S. retail industry as a control group because retailers, like financial
institutions, closely interact with consumers, and they collect large
amounts of data. However, we do acknowledge important differences
between retailers and banks: retailers do not typically collect as much
personal information as banks; second, they do not have the same type
of affiliate structures as banks.
Finally, it is worth noting that due to technical limitations, such as
robot exclusion,45 the Internet Archive did not archive the policies of
all of the institutions we studied every year. Thus, we were not able to
collect all of the policies that companies posted. In total, we have
collected 314 of the 360 privacy policies we attempted to collect.
B. RESEARCH METHODS
We began by collecting 314 privacy policies. All policies were
stored in our database. We then performed an automated analysis to
gather basic statistics on each policy. Finally, one pre-GLB policy and
one post-GLB policy for each company were reviewed by a privacy
expert and coded into a format suitable for statistical analysis.
Our automated analysis captured textual statistics on each policy,
including the number of words and sentences in each policy and
readability scores.46 Various readability measurements exist; many
calculate a score that is equivalent to a grade level in U.S. schools.
We used the Flesh-Kincaid readability score, which is the most
commonly used method for evaluating the readability of technical
documents.47
45 A site may post a file (robot.txt) on their web server, specifying the directories that are to be
excluded from archiving by automated robots (computer programs).
46 We automated this process by writing customized computer programs. The "style"
command in UNIX provided most of the textual statistics. We also used tools in Microsoft
Word to gather some statistics.
47 The Flesh-Kincaid readability score is calculated in the following way: FKL =
11.8*syllables/wds+0.39*wds/sentences-15.59. The result corresponds to an equivalent grade
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Our coding process was facilitated by the use of software we
developed that presented the coder with a privacy policy, a coding
form, and a code book, side-by-side on a computer screen. The coding
form asked the coder to identify the types of data collected, the uses of
that data, the data retention policy, access policy, and other key points.
When information was unclear or missing from a privacy policy,
coders also spent some time reviewing the associated Web site to see
whether any of the missing information was provided elsewhere. Any
remaining unclear or missing information was coded as "unknown."
After a coder completed coding a privacy policy, the software saved
the coded information in a computer-readable format for later
statistical analysis. 48 To ensure that we did not suffer from coding
bias, a second expert coded 15% of the policies on key variables. We
found that the coders agreed 95% of the time.
IV. RESEARCH RESULTS
We analyzed the data collected to answer our four research
questions:
" What effect has GLB had on financial institution
privacy policies and practices?
* Did GLB have an impact on the readability of
financial privacy notices?
" Have regulated companies adopted policies that
minimally comply with GLB, or have they adopted
policies that exceed the mandated requirements?
level in US schools. We used the "style" command in UNIX to gather this statistic. we also
computed other readability statistics such as Automated Readability Index, Gunning-Fog
indices, Coleman-Liau index. However, the choice of readability statistics did not
significantly impact our results.
48 The coded information about each privacy policy was stored as a computer readable privacypolicy using an extended version of the Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) we created that
included the ability to mark data practices as "unknown." A second coder coded 15% of our
policies. We found that the second coder agreed 95% of the time with the original coder.
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* How does the level of privacy offered by companies
regulated by GLB compare with the level of privacy
offered by companies in unregulated industries?
In order to measure the effect of GLB on financial institution
privacy policies, we examined the quality of the privacy notices
themselves as well as the level of privacy offered both before and after
GLB went into effect. The quality of privacy notices is generally
measured by their completeness and comprehensibility. The more
complete and comprehensible a policy, the better consumers will
understand a company's practices. Completeness of privacy policies is
often measured against the U.S. FTC's fair information practices,
which has five essential components: notice, choice/consent, access,
security, enforcement, and remedies. 49 We discuss our findings on
completeness in Section 4.1. Measuring comprehensibility requires
determining whether people understand what the policy says.
Generally, performing a readability analysis of the text is the first step
in measuring comprehensibility. We discuss our findings on
comprehensibility in Section 4.2. Many factors are considered in
determining the level of privacy offered. In this study we focused on
information sharing, as this is the focus of the GLB privacy rule. We
discuss our findings on information sharing in Section 4.3. Finally, we
compare our data on financial institutions with our data on retailers in
section 4.4.
Overall, we found only modest impacts of GLB on financial
institution privacy policies. We found that post-GLB privacy policies
are longer, more complete, and more standardized than pre-GLB
policies. They are also slightly easier to read, but still require college-
level reading skills to comprehend. Most companies we surveyed
have adopted policies that do not exceed the mandated requirements
and provide a level of privacy lower than those provided by the top
retailers we surveyed.
49 See FTC, "Fair Information Practice Principles," http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/
fairinfo.htm (accessed Sept. 21, 2006). It is worth noting that the FTC's version of fair
information practices is a watered down version of the OECD Guidelines, which contains
eight principles: collection limitation, data quality, purpose specification, use limitation,
security safeguards, openness, individual participation, and accountability. See OECD
Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data,
http://www.oecd.org/
document/18/0,2340,en_2649_34255_1815186_1_1_11,00.html (accessed Oct. 11, 2006).
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A. POST-GLB PRIVACY POLICIES ARE MORE SUBSTANTIAL IN
CONTENT, MORE COMPLETE, AND MORE STANDARDIZED
The privacy policies we examined became longer, more complete,
and more standardized after the GLB Act took effect.
We observed that the length of the policies among the random
thirty banks increased rapidly from 1999 to 2002, and then leveled off.
These changes started before the legislation went into effect (the GLB
was passed in November 1999 but did not take effect until July 2001),
probably due to companies revising their privacy policies in order to
be in compliance by the time the law took effect. It is also possible
that due to the increasing attention that data privacy was receiving
during that period, companies expanded their privacy policies to
promote consumer confidence.
The policies of the top ten banks became more substantial over
time but do not exhibit the same pattern as the policies of the random
banks. The difference we observed between the two group was that
pre-GLB, the privacy policies of the top ten banks were already more
substantial than the random thirty banks (average of 1504 words
compared to 508 words). Thus, less change was necessary to comply
with the law. Interestingly, some top banks with longer policies before
GLB shortened their policies after the GLB was enacted. We observed
a similar trend in the random group. Credit card companies' policies
also became longer over our period of study, increasing from 900
words to 1600 words.
Figure 1 shows the length of policies (measured by the number of
words) for the top ten and random thirty banks from 1999 to 2005.
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Mean length of Privacy Policies
2000
1:00 1812
.,..rj .. 1 1..a18 .- 1486
. 1400 1429
1200
1000- 1 1117 1132 1147 18
~800-C= 600o 37 -- Top 10 banks
00 =-Random 30 banks
400- GLB enacted July 2001
200 
T
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Figure 1: Mean length of privacy policies measured by the number
of words for the top ten and random thirty banks from 1999 to
2005. The number of data points from 1999 to 2005 for the
random thirty banks are: 7, 29, 27, 26, 25, 24, and 30; for the top
ten banks are 5, 8, 8, 5, 6, 5, 10. The GLB privacy rule went into
effect on July 1, 2001
We observed that post-GLB policies are also more complete than
pre-GLB policies. To measure completeness, we looked at whether
the coder was able to determine the following information for each
privacy policy: what information the company collects, whether it
shares information with affiliates, what information it shares with
affiliates, what choice it gives to consumers for affiliate sharing, and
similar questions for sharing with non-affiliated third parties. We
found that pre-GLB policies had a high percentage of unknowns, 50 but
post-GLB policies are more complete. The result for the random thirty
50 As part of the coding process, the coders read each privacy policy carefully to determine if
the policy mentioned anything about whether the company shares information with affiliates
or third parties, and if so what information is shared, and what choice is given to consumers.
If after reading the privacy policy, the coders could not determine the answers to these
questions, they coded it as "unknown."
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group is presented in Figure 2. Data from the top ten group exhibits a
similar pattern; however, top-ten banks had fewer unknowns prior to
GLB than the random thirty banks. 51
Completeness of Privacy Policies In the Random 30 banks
83%
Affiliate Affiliate Affiliate Third-Party Third-Party Third-Party
Sharing Disclosure Choice Sharing Disclosure Choice
Figure 2: Percentage of privacy polices coded as "unknown" for
the random thirty group. Unknown means that after reading the
policy, we are unable to decide the company's practices regarding
such sharing. Affiliate and third party disclosure refers to the
types of information to be disclosed to affiliates and third parties
respectively
From reading the privacy policies, we observed that before GLB,
many financial institutions posted privacy policies that modeled the
American Bankers Association's privacy principle.52  The principle,
announced in 1997, was an industry wide initiative to promote privacy
51 Data for the top ten group: affiliate sharing unknown: pre-GLB, 20%, post-GLB 0%;
affiliate disclosure: pre-GLB, 30%, post-GLB 0%; affiliate choice: pre-GLB, 30%, post-GLB
0%; third-party sharing unknown: pre-GLB, 10%, post-GLB 0%; third-party choice unknown:
pre-GLB, 40%, post GLB 0%.
52 Available at American Bankers Association, "American Bankers Association Privacy
Principles," http://www.aba.com/About+ABA/ABA_privprinpublic.htm (accessed Sept. 21,
2006).
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protection.53 Pre-GLB, many banks - especially those in the random
thirty group - based their privacy policies closely on the principle,
making few modifications. The FTC, in its final rule for GLB privacy
in 2000, included GLB compliant privacy policy examples. Post-
GLB, most banks use the FTC's template with little modification.
We verified our observation using a textual similarity measure.
Our measure gauges the similarity between the two policies by the
number of overlapped words and the frequency of their usage. If two
documents use the same set of vocabularies and the frequency of their
usage is similar, then our measure would be close to 1.
Our analysis shows that there is a significant change in the content
of the privacy policies from 2000 to 2001, as they use a different set of
vocabularies. This is indicated by the fact that the similarity score for
policies from 2000 to 2001 is much lower than in the other years we
examined. The results are shown in 3.
Textual Similarity of Privacy Policies for the random 30 group
1.0 ,' 0.6
0.90 0.90
0.8- o.7
.- 0.6-
a- 0.4-X
0.2-
0.0 1999-2000 2000-2001 2001-2002 2002-2003 2003-2004 200 2005
GB went into effect in July 2001
Figure 3: Mean textual similarity of privacy policies for the
random thirty group. Policies from the same institution in
adjacent years are compared
(for example 99 with 2000, 2000 with 2001)
53 Virginia Boyd, "Financial Privacy in the United States and the European Union: A Path to
Trans-Atlantic Regulatory Harmonization," (Harvard Law School, 2005), 17-18.
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B. THE READABILITY OF POLICIES HAS IMPROVED GRADUALLY BUT
NOT SIGNIFICANTLY
The readability of financial privacy policies continually improved
during the time period examined, with the largest changes observed
between 1999 and 2002. In 1999, policies had an average Kincaid
readability score of 14.5. This dropped to 13.0 in 2002. Figure 4
shows this improvement for the top ten and random thirty banks.
Readability of Privacy Notices
* Top 10 banks
-Random 30 Sample
GLB enacted July
2001
11.5
11
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Figure 4: Mean readability of privacy policies measured by the
Kincaid score for the top ten and random thirty banks group from
1999 to 2005. The number of data points for the random thirty
banks from 1999 to 2005 is: 7, 29, 27, 26, 25, 24, and 30; for the top
ten banks are 5, 8, 8, 5, 6, 5, 10. GLB went into effect on July 1,
2001. The Kincaid score corresponds to the equivalent years of
education needed to understand the text
The average Kincaid score after 2002 leveled off at about 13.0,
which roughly is equivalent to the U.S. college freshman reading
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level. 4 In light of the fact that in 2005 48% of the population over 15
has a high school or less education,Y and comparing the common
readability scores for other materials, the readability improvement we
observed probably has not had much real impact. In addition, it is
important to keep in mind that readability scores are calculated based
on the length of words, sentences, and paragraphs, only. They do not
take into account use of jargon or unfamiliar words, vague language,
complicated sentence structure, or references to laws with which most
people are unlikely to be familiar.
For example, although the following two statements have similar
readability scores, the second makes a much more direct statement
than the first:
Bank A: "We do not share information about you with third
parties outside of .... except as permitted by law."
Bank B: "We may share all the information we collect with
our affiliates, and we may also share your information with
companies we have joint marketing agreements with."
Arguably Bank A's statement is likely to mislead most consumers
into thinking that Bank A engages in little sharing of personal
information. In fact, Bank A and Bank B have virtually the same data
sharing practices. The reason for this misunderstanding is that
consumers may not know that the law actually contains only very
limited restrictions on data sharing.
C. BANKS AND CREDIT CARD COMPANIES MINIMALLY COMPLY WITH
GLB - SHARING WITH AFFILIATES AND THIRD PARTIES INCREASED
PosT-GLB
Top ten banks and credit card companies surveyed appear to only
minimally comply with GLB, offering few if any privacy protections
that go beyond what the law requires. These companies collect large
54 We have calculated various other readability measures such as ARI, and Gunning Fog
index, and found similar trends.
55 U.S Census Bereau, Educational Attainment in the United States: 2004, Table 1,
http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/education/cps2004.html (accessed March
26, 2006).
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amounts of information from consumers and share information
extensively with affiliates and third parties.
Typical information that banks collect include:
* application information such as personal
information, assets, income, and debts;
* transaction information such as account balances,
types of account, payment history, credit card usage;
" consumer report information such as
creditworthiness or credit history;
* information from outside sources such as
employment verification, information about credit
and other relationships, verification of information
such as property insurance coverage; and
* information from online interactions with the
company's Web site.
As shown in Figure 5, all of the top ten banks and 90% of the top
ten credit issuers had policies in 2005 indicating that they may share
all information they collect with the affiliates. Only 10% of the banks
in the random thirty group do not share with affiliates.
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Information Shared with Affiliated Companies
30% 17%10
50%
83%
0/
I~13%1Y
2000 1 2005 2000 2005 2000 2005
Top 10 Random 30 Credit Card
E All Information 0 Transactional Information 5 Do not share 0 Unclear
Figure 5: Affiliate sharing in 2000 and 2005 for the top ten banks,
random thirty banks, and the top ten personal credit issuers
Prior to the enactment of GLB, many bank privacy policies did not
state clearly whether or not they shared information with affiliates or
third parties. However, based on the high rate of affiliate sharing
observed in 2005, it appears that this sharing has either increased or
remained unchanged. In addition, because GLB relaxes restrictions on
the acquisition of affiliates, banks are acquiring an increasing number
of affiliates and engaging in mergers. When banks merge, a large
amount of customer information is consolidated. Since GLB places no
limits on affiliate sharing, and few banks have voluntarily adopted
policies that restrict their own affiliate sharing, individuals' financial
data is now being shared more extensively than it was before GLB was
enacted. This will be addressed in more detail in the policy
implications section.
We also examined third-party sharing (including joint marketing)
before and after GLB. As shown in Figure 6, third-party sharing also
appears to have increased after GLB was enacted.
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Third party sharing + joint marketing
E yes o no m unclear
20% 20% 200
20%
37%
0% 80% 80%
700%
50% 50%
2000 2005 2000 1 05 2000 2005
Top 10 Random 30 Credit Card
Figure 6: Third-party sharing including joint marketing in 2000
and 2005 for each of the groups
Although privacy policies often discuss third-party sharing and
joint marketing agreements separately, we combined them here. We
categorized joint marketing sharing as sharing with third parties,
because in essence joint marketers are third parties. GLB does not
require companies to offer consumers the ability to opt-out of joint
marketing as long as they disclose in their privacy policies that they
may engage in joint marketing. However, if an opt-out is offered, then
joint marketers can be treated as ordinary third parties, who may be
permitted to further share the information with other companies. We
found that the number of institutions sharing with third parties actually
increased from 2000 to 2005.
D. ToP RETAILERS' PRIVACY PoLICIEs EVOLVE MORE GRADUALLY,
ARE LESS STANDARDIZED, BUT OFFER BETTER CHOICES THAN TOP
BANKS
The top retailers' privacy policies exhibited a similar pattern of
change as observed in the policies of top financial institutions during
the period examined. Figure 7 shows that the average length of the
retail privacy policies increased at about the same pace as those of
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financial institutions, lending further support to the idea that GLB did
not significantly change the policies of top financial institutions. It
would be useful to compare a sample of random retailers similar to our
random thirty banks to see whether random retailers' policies showed
a sharp increase during the same time period that we observed a sharp
increase in the length of random thirty bank policies. This would
provide additional insights into whether changes in bank policies were
directly caused by GLB. We did, however, observe that privacy
policies in the retail sector evolved more gradually than they did in the
financial sector. The median textual similarity between 2000 and 2001
was 0.89 for the retail sector, compared with 0.54 for the top-ten
banks.
Mean length of Privacy Policies
2000
1800, 1812
11708
16001
1400 1 1 4
i 1200
1000
E
" 800
-- Top 10 banks
600 -- Top 10 retailers
400 IGLB enacted July 2001
200
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Figure 7: Length of privacy notices between retailer and banks
Overall privacy policies in the retail sector are more readable than
in the financial sector. As shown in Figure 8, the readability of
policies changed little for top-ten institutions during the period we
studied.
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Readability of Privacy Notices
16 _
-- Top 10 banks
15-
--- Top 10 retailers
>14 13.9
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I 11 11. 11. 11.711.
10
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Figure 8: Readability of policies between retailer and banks
Although the privacy policies of retailers are more readable, they are
less standardized than the policies of financial institutions. For
example, there is no standard definition of what constitutes an
"affiliate" in the retail sector. Some policies refer to "partners" and
others use the term "subsidiaries."
I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
Bank Vs. Retailers
100% 100% 100%
80% M Top 10 Banks
c3 Top 10 retailers
40% 40%
Affiliate Sharing Third-Party Shanng Opt-out of all marketing
Figure 9: Information sharing practices of top ten banks and top
retailers, the graph shows the percentage of companies in each
category who share with affiliates, with third parties, and the opt
out choices given
All of the retailers surveyed shared personal information with
affiliates, and none of them offered opt-out choices. This is very
similar to what we observed in the banking industry. With regards to
third-party sharing for marketing, only four out of ten retailers shared
their information with third parties, and all of them offered opt-out
choices. All of the retailers surveyed offered consumers opt-out
choices for marketing, both internal and external, while only four of
the top ten banks offered similar choices. These results are shown in
Figure 9.
Our comparison between the top-ten banks and top-ten retailers
gives us some insights into the impacts of GLB as compared with
other influences, but it does not give us a complete picture for two
reasons. First, our sample size is small, we only included the top ten
retailers with significant online presence. Second, the retail industry
has a very different structure from the financial industry. For example,
compared to the financial industry, retailers affiliate networks are not
as extensive. Nevertheless, both industries are similarly influenced by
other factors such as competition, increasing Internet adoption, rising
privacy concerns, and increasing growth of e-commerce.
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V. POLICY IMPLICATION
Our research shows that GLB serves some public policy objectives
by making privacy policies more complete. The standard format and
common vocabulary enables comparison amongst financial
institutions. However, the readability of privacy policies has not
improved significantly, thus such notices do not result in the majority
of the population being better informed. Content analysis of the
privacy policies shows that top banks and personal credit issuers
minimally comply with GLB and there is little difference in terms of
affiliate and third-party data sharing among banks before and after
GLB went into effect. This result has several policy implications.
A. IMPACTS OF INCREASED AFFILIATE AND THIRD PARTY SHARING
The fact that banks share extensively with affiliates without giving
consumers choice has troubling implications. First, GLB removes
restrictions on banks acquiring affiliates. As shown in Figure 10,
between 1999 and 2004 there were 1216 acquisitions of non-banks by
banks. This is broken down by sector in Table 6. When banks merge,
usually customer information databases are consolidated. In many
circumstances, affiliate information sharing has little to do with the
original purpose for which information was collected. For example,
under the law, it is entirely plausible that a travel company owned by a
bank could go through a customer's transaction data (for example,
credit card charges) to find their favorite destinations and mail
solicitations for travel deals.
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Number of Acquisitions Banks on Non-Banks
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Figure 10: Number of Acquisitions banks on non-banks
Total TransactionsNon-Bank Sectors(19-04 (1999-2004)
Insurance 405
Securities & Investments 317
Mortgage Production/Servicing Ops 121
Specialty Finance 124
Credit Card 76
Trust 60
Table 6: Acquisitions by sector since GLB enacted
B. WOULD THE SHORT NOTICE APPROACH WORK?
To improve the readability of financial privacy notices, the federal
government as well as industry groups has proposed using short56
notices that summarize the complete legal notice. Although we
56 Interagency Proposal to Consider Alternative Forms of Privacy Notices Under the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act, 68 Fed. Reg. 75,164 (Dec. 30, 2003),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/12/031223anprfinalglbnotices.pdf.
[Vol. 2:3
SHENG & CRANOR
believe this approach can better inform consumers, we argue that this
direction has its inherent limitations. Current research on disclosure
systems supports the theory that a disclosure system would not achieve
its goal if consumers have few real choices or do not believe there is
anything more they need to know. 5 7 For example, Archon et al., found
that the restaurant rating systems in Los Angeles County make it easy
for consumers to compare restaurants hygiene ratings, giving the
restaurant owners a strong incentive to improve their hygiene.
However, other transparency systems have failed to work very well.
For example, federal and state laws that require employers to label
hazardous substances in their workplace seems to have little impact in
part because workers have very constrained choices about where to
work and/or limited ability to change workplace conditions.
Will a short financial privacy notice serve a similar function as a
restaurant rating system that could change consumer banking
behaviors? Currently banks and credit card companies minimally
comply with GLB, so the practices and choices they offer are very
similar to each other and consumers' options with regards to privacy
are limited. Perhaps short notices would provide additional incentives
for some banks to adopt better practices in order to differentiate
themselves.
C. IMPACTS OF VARIOUS STATE LAWS
The GLB privacy rule does not preempt other state laws that offer
stronger privacy controls. As a result, a number of states have taken
advantage of this and have enacted their own privacy laws that are
stronger than GLB. For example, the California state legislature
concluded that "the GLB Act increases the likelihood that the personal
financial information of California residents will be widely shared
among, between, and within companies. . . The policies intended to
protect financial privacy imposed by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act are
inadequate to meet the privacy concerns of California residents., 5 8 As
a result, they have enacted the financial privacy law for California
(California SB 1).
57 Archon Fung, David Weil, Mary Graham and Elena Fagotto, The Political Economy of
Transparency. What Makes Disclosure Policies Effective? (Boston: Ash Institute for
Democratic Governance and Innovation, 2004).
" California Financial Information Privacy Act, Cal. Fin. Code § 4051.5 (West 2005),
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgi-bin/displaycode?section=fn&group=04001-05000&fie=4050-4060.
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Other states like Vermont and North Dakota have taken advantage
of the no preemption clause in the GLB privacy rule and enacted
tougher privacy laws. Increasing state laws and interstate commerce
poses a compliance nightmare for banks; banks have to comply with
differing state laws. If more states adopt supplemental privacy laws, a
point would be reached when it is too costly for financial institutions
to comply with every state law. This might actually clear the way for
a more stringent, uniform national privacy law. This is certainly one
of the reasons Microsoft is proposing comprehensive federal data
privacy legislation that seeks to preempt state laws.59
VI. DIscussIoN AND FUTURE WORK
This research provides some preliminary insights into the effects of
the GLB privacy rule. However it also raises many additional
questions and suggests other research areas to explore.
In order to better understand the trends we observed and to draw
stronger statistically significant results, future work should sample a
larger set of institutions, as well as draw comparisons with other
industry sectors within the US and other countries.
While the majority of the banks share extensively, a few do have
policies that offer privacy protections beyond what is required by law.
For example, in the top ten group, Bank of America and Wells Fargo
do not share with non-affiliated third parties. A few banks in the
random thirty group also do not share with third parties. Why have
these banks chosen not to share with affiliates, contrary to common
industry practice? They may see privacy as an important issue to
promote consumer trust, and therefore it is in their best interest not to
share. For example, the Bank of America privacy policy says, "the
law gives you protections, but we give you more." An alternative
hypothesis is simply that they do not share with third parties because
they have so many affiliates that they have no need to share with non-
affiliated third parties.
59 Brad Smith, general council for Microsoft, explained that "[t]he growing focus on privacy at
both state and federal levels has resulted in an increasingly rapid adoption of well-intended
privacy laws that are at times overlapping, inconsistent and often incomplete. This is not only
confusing for businesses, but it also leaves consumers unprotected. A single federal approach
will create a common standard for protection that consumers and businesses can understand
and count on." Microsoft, "Microsoft Advocates Comprehensive Federal Privacy Legislation,"
November 3, 2005, http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/press/2005/novO5/11-
03DataPrivacyPR.mspx.
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When banks with different privacy practices merge or banks
acquire credit card companies, what kind of policies do they adopt?
Do they tend to adopt the policies with more or less privacy
protection? What are the factors that determine their decision?
Legislation generally not only affects the regulated industry, it can
have some ripple effects in other industries as well. Could the
enactment of financial privacy legislation be causing voluntary
improvements in privacy practices in other industries that are hoping
to avoid similar legislation? This is an interesting and important
question to explore further.
Although privacy policies are gradually becoming more readable,
it is still not clear whether consumers can actually comprehend these
policies. Can consumers understand the meaning and implications of
their data sharing? Studies are needed in which privacy policies are
read and interpreted by average consumers.
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In the absence of privacy regulation, some companies have
voluntarily enrolled self-regulatory programs such as TRUSTe, and
BBBOnline. Do companies that enroll in these programs have better
policies than companies that do not enroll? How do the policies of
companies enrolled in these programs compare with the policies of
companies subject to privacy legislation?
Finally, our research looked at how the law affects external-facing
privacy policies. How does the law affect the internal policies and
practices of companies, for example resource allocation, internal data
practices, policy enforcement, and communications with employees
about privacy policies? An examination of internal privacy practices
in regulated and unregulated companies would provide additional
insights into the impacts of privacy laws.
60 Cranor et al. compared the comprehensibility of three natural language privacy policies with
natural language interpretations of computer-readable privacy policies created by two Platform
for Privacy Preferences ("P3P") user agents. College-educated participants were asked to
answer four questions about each policy they read and then to rate the ease with which they
were able to perform each task. Although participants were able to answer the questions using
the natural language and computer generated policies almost equally well, they reported that
they found the computer-generated policies much easier to understand. L. Cranor, P. Guduru,
and M. Arjula. "User Interfaces for Privacy Agents," ACM Transactions on Computer-Human
Interaction, 2006 (forthcoming).
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